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Over the last thirty years the US and many other
countries have experienced a revolution in the ex-
tent and nature of the mechanisms used by govern-
ment to regulate the structure, behavior and perfor-
mance of many markets for goods and services (Win-
ston 1993, 2006; Peltzman and Winston 2000; Joskow
2005; Joskow 2009). This era of reform is often re-
ferred to as the era of “deregulation”. However, the
phrase “deregulation”is a simplistic characterization
of a much more complex process that involved the
relaxation of government controls over prices and
entry in some industries, industry restructuring and
privatization to facilitate competition in these and
other industries, the introduction of new regulatory
mechanisms in industry segments that continued to
be subject to price and entry regulation,the adoption
of market-based mechanisms for controlling air pol-
lution and tighter standards governing air and water
emissions and land use,and changes in product qual-
ity and safety and workplace safety regulations.
With all of the recent hysteria about the evils of
“deregulation”,one would think that the market lib-
eralization and regulatory reforms of the last decade
have imposed enormous economic costs.To the con-
trary, while there are certainly exceptions, financial
market regulation being the leading contemporary
case,just the opposite has been the reality.Commen-
tators seem to have forgotten that many pre-1970s
regulatory programs focused on protecting produc-
ers from competition rather than protecting con-
sumers, created production and allocational ineffi-
ciencies, and that many of the US federal environ-
mental, product quality, and product and workplace
safety regulations that have been a subject of contin-
uing controversy did not even exist prior to the
1970s. Moreover, some of the most significant costs
of these “deregulation” efforts have often been the
result of too little deregulation, industry restructur-
ing and regulatory reform rather than too much
(Peltzman and Winston 2000; Winston 1993; Joskow
and Rose 1989; Joskow 2005).
The generally favorable assessments of regulatory re-
form over the last thirty years have been tainted by
the ongoing financial market crisis and its adverse
effects on the real economy.Ironically,one of the few
important sectors of the US economy that has not
been subject to comprehensive regulatory reform du-
ring the last thirty years is the financial services sec-
tor and the associated financial products they supply
and financial markets where they are traded. Yet
financial institutions, financial instruments, the mar-
kets where they are trade and the geographical ex-
panse of trading have all changed dramatically over
the last thirty years.
While it has become routine in the US and other
countries to place a large share of the blame for the
current financial crisis on “deregulation”, the list of
US state and federal regulatory agencies with juris-
diction over banks, insurance companies, brokerage
firms, mutual funds and other financial institutions,
the products they supply and the markets where they
trade,is as long as my left arm.The one thing that we
can be sure of is that the US had no shortage of state
and federal regulatory agencies with overlapping
responsibilities for investor protection, financial mar-
ket behavior and performance,and systemic risk mit-
igation (prudential regulation) that collectively were
supposed to work to keep this kind of financial mar-
ket mess from occurring. However, these regulatory
institutions have evolved over the last seventy-five
years in a haphazard fashion that has not responded
effectively to the evolution of financial institutions,
products, and markets.The first order assessment of
the regulatory framework for financial products and
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zation with which I am affiliated.markets is not so much that there is too little regula-
tion in general, but that the regulatory framework
worked poorly, did not adapt effectively to changes
in financial products and markets,and was too heav-
ily influenced by political pressures from many inter-
est groups.
Similarly, in the case of the BP Gulf of Mexico oil
spill, there was no shortage of regulatory agencies
with responsibilities to oversee the safety and envi-
ronmental consequences of deep water drilling in
the deep Gulf. The Mineral Management Service
(MMS), the US Environmental Protection Agency
and the US Coast Guard all have regulatory respon-
sibilities over drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. These
responsibilities were reasonably well defined in the-
ory, but did not work very well in practice.The regu-
lators had not kept up with rapid changes in tech-
nology, had overlapping responsibilities, had poten-
tial conflicts of interest in the case of MMS, were
influenced by powerful interest groups, had inade-
quate resources to do their jobs well and had to rely
heavily on the oil and gas exploration and produc-
tion companies for expertise and technology in the
case of an accident.
In the media (Surowiecki 2010) and among the pub-
lic, the financial market crisis, the Gulf oil spill and
other economic, health and safety incidents are now
frequently blamed generically on “deregulation”and
an excessive “free market”mentality.This in turn has
created a growing distrust of markets (e.g.,the oppo-
sition to cap and trade mechanisms to control green-
house gas emissions) that is being used by interest
groups who oppose market liberalization generally
to launch a “reregulation”process in many other sec-
tors of the economy that were “deregulated” over
the last three decades.
I argue here that we need a much more nuanced
approach to regulatory reform that balances the be-
nefits of market allocation, the costs of market
imperfections, the potential benefits of tightening,
loosening or changing regulatory frameworks, and
the costs of regulatory imperfections in practice ra-
ther than in theory. In particular, the financial mar-
ket crisis,the Gulf oil spill and other recent incidents
should make it clear that “more regulation” per se
will not improve market performance and may make
it worse.If tighter regulations seem to be a good idea
in theory,we must take account of how regulation will
work in practice in a world where truly independent
regulators do not exist, where regulatory resources
are constrained, where regulated firms have superior
information to those who regulate them and where
political pressures from interest groups who seek to
use regulation to feather their own nests are a con-
stant reality.
What is government regulation?
No markets in modern developed economies are
completely “unregulated” by government-created
institutions in any meaningful sense. Markets in all
modern developed market economies operate within
a basic set of governance institutions or what William-
son has called the basic institutions of capitalism
(Williamson 1985).These include,in the US and other
Anglo-Saxon countries, common law institutions like
property rights, liability rules, contract laws and the
institutions for enforcing them. There are also basic
firm and market institutions created by statute, such
as corporate law, including the framework for creat-
ing limited liability corporations, antitrust laws,
bankruptcy laws, employment laws, environmental
laws, etc. We can discuss the pros and cons of the
details of alternative structures for these basic insti-
tutions of capitalism and how they are implemented
and enforced, but there are no 21st century devel-
oped market economies without them. These basic
institutions of capitalism “regulate” markets in im-
portant ways that should not be ignored. Regulatory
changes of various kinds are properly viewed as
adding,subtracting or reforming government regula-
tory actions that exceed or alter this minimal set of
competitive market institutions.
Market imperfections
How do we make an intellectually respectable case
for implementing various types of government regu-
lation, for removing them, or for changing the way
we regulate? We should recognize first that competi-
tive markets are a powerful mechanism for allocat-
ing scarce resources reasonably efficiently, even if
not exactly first best.In a sense,competitive markets
combined with the basic legal institutions of modern
developed market economies represent the null hy-
pothesis against which the case for additional regu-
lation and alternative forms of additional regulation
must be tested. The case for government regulatory
interventions must start, but not stop, with the iden-
tification and quantification of one or more market
imperfections (Winston 2006). These market im-
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perfections include market power,with natural mono-
poly being the extreme case (Joskow 2007), external-
ities,information costs,information asymmetries,con-
sumer/investor decision-making imperfections,bound-
ed rationality and transaction costs generally (Willi-
amson 1975; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). It is impossi-
ble to regulate intelligently,even under the best of cir-
cumstances, if we cannot clearly articulate what the
nature of the market imperfections are whose costs we
are trying to ameliorate.
Few if any markets are perfect in the sense that they
satisfy the assumptions underlying textbook models
of perfect competition or yield the performance as-
sociated with these textbook models. Market imper-
fections are the norm not the exception. But the
social costs of these market imperfections vary wide-
ly from the trivial to the very large – compared to the
performance of hypothetical textbook perfectly
competitive markets. However, the fact that we can
identify one or more market imperfections does not
necessarily make a case for imposing government re-
gulations on the relevant market unless we believe in
the existence of a benevolent, costless and perfectly
informed regulator familiar from economic theory.
Such a regulator would be able to costlessly “fix” all
market imperfections and, in turn, always improve
market performance, however small the social costs
of the market imperfection at issue might be.Accor-
dingly, if the benevolent, costless, perfectly informed
government regulator existed in reality we would
regulate almost every market since almost every
market is imperfect compared to the textbook ideal.
Of course, while such regulators may exist in theo-
retical models, they do not exist in reality.
Regulatory imperfections
Having identified the nature and costs of suspected
market imperfections,we must look at the other side
of the equation as well so that we can properly bal-
ance the costs of market imperfections against the
benefits and costs of imperfect regulatory institu-
tions.We can easily conceptualize the potential ben-
efits associated with fully mitigating the market im-
perfections identified in a world where we assume
the existence of a benevolent, costless and perfectly
informed regulator.However,the worst mistake that
can be made by policymakers is to assume that gov-
ernment regulatory institutions pursue some well-
defined public interest, are well informed, can easily
and costlessly mitigate the market imperfections
identified and are not influenced by interest groups
that can benefit or be harmed by their regulatory de-
cisions. Accordingly, we must recognize that regula-
tion necessarily carries with it its own costs – direct
implementation costs,but more importantly,indirect
costs that can make market performance even worse
than it was if we simply lived with the market imper-
fections at issue.These costs must be viewed dynam-
ically, recognizing that technological change will af-
fect consumer, firm, product, process and industry
attributes and, in turn, that regulation can affect the
rate and direction of the changes in these attributes.
Indeed these dynamic effects often represent the
largest costs of imperfect regulation.These costs also
have implications for the design of regulatory mech-
anisms and institutions. Some institutions may look
“second best” in theory, but work better than others
in a world where information costs, enforcement costs,
human and physical resource availability and potential
political interference are taken into account.
The decision to regulate and the decision to change
regulatory policies, whether it is to eliminate a set of
regulatory constraints or to change the form of those
constraints, must turn on a careful balancing of the
likely costs of market imperfections and the likely
benefits and costs of alternative forms of regulation
designed to mitigate.These choices involve tradeoffs
and will never lead to a “first best” outcome. The
right approach to thinking about regulation and de-
regulation was articulated very clearly by my under-
graduate advisor Alfred Kahn:“What is the best that
we can do in an imperfect world?” (Kahn 1979).
To answer this question in practice we must recognize:
• Even if they have the right goals, regulators are
necessarily imperfectly informed about the firm
and consumer attributes, including attitudes
toward risk. However, this information is neces-
sary, even in theory, to regulate well (Laffont and
Tirole 1993; Joskow 2007). Indeed, regulators are
typically less well informed than are the firms that
they regulate and often less well informed about
the attributes of the consumers they may be seek-
ing to protect, leading to the potential for costly
distortions in production costs,product attributes,
and the rate and direction of innovation (regula-
tor-induced moral hazard).
• The regulatory process is characterized by bu-
reaucratic costs, can take long periods of time to
make decisions and is inherently conservative in
its treatment of new product and process tech-
nologies, risk, and new and better ways of regu-lating. Regulators also easily become self-protec-
tive of the traditional regulatory mechanisms that
characterize the status quo of the importance of
their places in the world.This becomes more and
more of a problem as regulatory agencies age.The
public competition among existing US financial
product and market regulatory agencies for a slice
of the pie created by a new financial product and
market regulatory framework is a case in point.
• The regulatory process is subject to interest group
capture, political influence, and tremendous pres-
sure to engage in (hidden) taxation by regulation
(Stigler 1971; Posner 1971; Noll 1989). The mod-
ern field of political economy based on rational
actor models of political behavior did not start
with studies of regulation by accident. This phe-
nomenon goes well beyond simplistic models of
capture by regulated firms and reflects the fact
that regulatory agencies have things that they can
do to help one interest group and harm others,na-
turally leading them to become targets of political
competition.This phenomenon is exacerbated over
time as young “expert”regulatory agencies become
dominated by commissioners and senior staff who
have come up through the political process and
are sensitive to the same political considerations
as are their sponsors in the executive and legisla-
tive branches and those they regulate.In my view,
this has become a more serious problem over
time as “independent” regulatory agencies once
heavily populated by reasonably independent tech-
nocratic experts with clear public interest goals
have increasingly come to be populated by com-
missioners and senior staff with narrower political
goals – whether it is on the less regulation or more
regulation extremes of the political spectrum de-
pending on which political faction is in power.
• When firms are subject to overlapping or substi-
tute regulatory jurisdictions, firms will seek to ex-
ploit gaps between the jurisdictions of regulatory
agencies and to be subject to regulation by the
agency under whose supervision they will do best.
This kind of regulatory arbitrage exists between
federal and state regulatory agencies, between fe-
deral regulatory agencies with overlapping juris-
dictions, and, when there are opportunities to ex-
ploit differences in regulatory frameworks, in dif-
ferent countries. For example, the existing frame-
work for regulating financial products and markets
was ripe for regulatory arbitrage of all three kinds.
• Regulation is not free. Regulators need adequate
human, information and financial resources to do
their jobs well. Absent adequate resources, regu-
lators will be unable to hire the appropriate per-
sonnel, obtain the necessary information and en-
force their regulatory responsibilities effectively.
As a result, they will often turn to “outsourcing”
some of their regulatory responsibilities to the firms
that they are supposed to regulate or to independ-
ent organizations created by the firms they regulate
(or so-called self-regulation).
A framework for evaluating regulatory reform pro-
posals
A useful framework for evaluating proposals to regu-
late, to deregulate and to change the way regulation
can be captured involves asking and answering a set
of simple questions,though providing precise answers
to these questions may often be quite difficult. I will
articulate the questions from the perspective of pro-
posed new regulations but a similar set of questions
can be applied to deregulation and to the considera-
tion of the adoption of new regulatory mechanisms.
• Precisely what are the market imperfections that
the proposed regulations are trying to fix and what
are the causes of these market imperfections?
• What are the social costs of these market imper-
fections and who bears them?
• What alternative regulatory arrangements may
be available to mitigate the market imperfections
and why is one likely to be better than the other? 
• How much will the costs of market imperfections
be reduced if the proposed regulations are imple-
mented successfully?
• What information and authority would a regula-
tor need to implement the proposed regulations
effectively?
• What resources must be made available to the
regulators for them to perform their job well?
What are the likely direct costs of implementing
the regulatory framework?
• What potential indirect costs may be incurred by
implementing the proposed regulations given the
potential regulatory imperfections discussed ear-
lier, especially indirect dynamic costs?
• What kinds of transparency policies and adminis-
trative procedures will be adopted to minimize
covert political interference with the actions of
the regulator?
• On balance what will the likely net benefits or the
likely net costs of the proposed regulations be in
practice? 
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• How will the performance of the regulatory frame-
work be evaluated over time and who will do this
evaluation?
Conclusions
Balancing the costs of market imperfections against
the (net) costs of regulatory imperfections provides
a robust framework for evaluating regulatory re-
forms. On the other hand, simply characterizing the
issues as “regulation” vs. “markets” is not construc-
tive. As we balance the costs of imperfect markets
against the benefits and costs of imperfect regulation
we must always come back to the question “what is
the best that we can do in an imperfect world?”
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